ROBERT MATTHEW CALHOUN

Paul's Definitions of the Gospel in Romans 1

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 316

Mohr Siebeck

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In memoriam

KIOWA TUMOK GARCIA

December 28, 1971 – July 2, 2009

Preface and Acknowledgements

The present study, a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, investigates two passages in Paul's letter to the Romans, 1:2–4 and 16–17, in which he defines 'gospel' in distinct ways, using a complex array of methods. My thesis and arguments herein grow directly from the ancient philosophical and rhetorical theoretical sources. The decision to follow this path has two main consequences that require articulation here in the preface. First, I try to avoid bland citations, in other words, references in the text or footnotes to passages from ancient authors that give little information about what they are saying or why it matters. I therefore often give lengthy quotations of the Greek, Latin, or Hebrew texts, so that the reader may readily judge their relevance for my arguments. My translations tend toward the literal, sometimes at the expense of good English idiom, in order to render my interpretive decisions as clear as possible. The bibliography includes all of the editions from which I took the quotations, along with more idiomatic English translations, where available (some of the rhetorical theory remains untranslated in any modern language), for the reader's convenience. Second, my interactions with the vast body of modern secondary literature on Paul and his letter to the Romans are selective, illustrative, and by no means complete. The study deals foremost with Rom 1:2–4 and 16–17, how the ancient sources impact interpretation of those verses, and, at key points, how patristic readers help us to perceive useful connections between them. (In order to minimize bibliographic clutter, I normally cite the author's surname and the abbreviated title; one may find full references in the bibliography.)

Over the course of my study at the University of Chicago, I have accumulated many debts of gratitude that I am delighted now to pay. My committee and professors in the Department of New Testament and Early Christian Literature have exhibited extraordinary mentorship, patience, and generosity. Prof. Margaret M. Mitchell, my advisor, read the manuscript with a careful eye to the little and the big: the little in finding various errors and correcting problems with my translations, and the big in asking penetrating questions of my logic, and in applying her enormous erudition toward challenging my arguments. Prof. Elizabeth Asmis gave superb advice on the rhetorical and philosophical sources. Prof. Hans Dieter Betz, who retired many years ago, generously continued to read my work and share his vast expertise. Profs. Hans

Josef Klauck and David Martinez, who were present on several occasions upon which I presented portions of the dissertation, gave extremely helpful advice that has enriched the final product. Several friends and colleagues read parts of the manuscript and endured interminable hours of listening to me thinking out loud: Matthew C. Baldwin, Meira Z. Kensky, James A. Kelhoffer, Clare K. Rothschild, Janet E. Spittler, Trevor W. Thompson, and D. Dale Walker. It goes without saying that, with such a learned group of readers, any remaining faults are to be attributed solely to my stubborn refusal to heed their advice.

My study of early Christian literature began at Abilene Christian University under the tutelage of an excellent faculty. Three persons in particular were instrumental in stoking my curiosity and equipping me for future research: Profs. John T. Willis, Thomas C. Geer, Jr., and Jack Reese. I also thank three professors with whom I took numerous seminars at Chicago, and who have influenced me profoundly: Profs. Christopher A. Faraone of the Classics Department, and Adela Yarbro Collins and John J. Collins, now of Yale Divinity School.

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My family and friends have been and remain a constant source of encouragement, without which I would have not been able to endure. This has been a labor of love; I know what love means because of them: my grandmother, Vera Nell Ellis; my mother Sandra Calhoun; my father and stepmother, Robert Lynn and Julie Calhoun; my siblings Andrew, Amanda, Daniel and Anna Grace; and a group of friends, too many to list, who helped me to maintain a precarious balance of sanity.

Finally, I thank Prof. Jörg Frey of Universität Zürich and Dr. Henning Ziebritzki of Mohr Siebeck for the honor of including my contribution in WUNT II, and Ms. Tanja Idler of Mohr Siebeck for her kind and thorough attention to detail in helping me to prepare the manuscript for publication.

I dedicate this project to the memory of a friend, Kiowa Tumok Garcia, who tragically took his own life on July 2, 2009.

Chicago
October, 2011

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List of Abbreviations

The symbol * indicates that the abbreviation in question has a fuller citation in the bibliography of modern works; the symbol † indicates a fuller citation under the corpora of ancient works. The abbreviation conventions generally conform to those specificed in Patrick Alexander, et al., editors, *The SBL Handbook of Style* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999).

AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	Friedman, et al., *Anchor Bible Dictionary**
AET	Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*†
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
Allen/Greenough	Greenough, et al., *Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar*
Althaus, *an die Römer*	Althaus, *Der Brief an die Römer* (NTD)*
ANRW	Temporini, Haase and Vogt, *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*
ANTC	Abingdon New Testament Commentaries
APAACS	American Philological Association, American Classical Studies
Barrett, *Romans*	Barrett, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (HNTC)*
BDAG	Bauer, Danker, Arndt and Gingrich, *Greek-English Lexicon**
BDB	Brown, Driver and Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament**
BDF	Blass, Debrunner and Funk, *Greek Grammar**
BNP	Cancik and Schneider, *Brill's New Pauly**
BRS	Biblical Resource Series
Budé	Collection des universités de France, publiée sons le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé
CBET	Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CCS	Cambridge Classical Studies
CCSL	Corpus cristianorum: Series latina
C.H.	Nock and Festugière, *Corpus Hermeticum*†
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
Cranfield, *Romans*	Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC)*
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
CW	*Classical World*
DNP	Cancik and Schneider, *Der Neue Pauly**
Dodd, *Romans*	Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (MNTC)*
Dunn, *Romans*	Dunn, *Romans* (WBC)*
EEC	Ferguson, *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* (2nd ed.)*
EECh	Di Berardino, *Encyclopedia of the Early Church**
EKKNT	Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament

ESIC	Emory Studies in Early Christianity
EvT	*Evangelische Theologie*
ExpTim	*Expository Times*
FF	Foundations and Facets
Fitzmyer, *Romans*	Fitzmyer, *Romans* (AB)*
Furley/Bremer	Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns*†
García Martinez/ Tigchelaar	García Martinez and Tigchelaar, *Dead Sea Scrolls*†
GCS	Die griechisch-christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte
GKC	Gesenius, Kautzsch and Cowley, *Hebrew Grammar**
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HB	*Hebrew Bible*
HNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HNTC	Harper's New Testament Commentaries
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
HTKNT	Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
HUT	Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
ICC	International Critical Commentary
IDB	Buttrick, *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*
JAC	*Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
Jewett, *Romans*	Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia)*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JSNTSup	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament* Supplement Series
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
Käsemann, *Romans*	Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans**
Keck, *Romans*	Keck, *Romans* (ANTC)*
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament
Kirk/Raven	Kirk and Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers*†
KB	Koehler and Baumgartner, *Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon*†
LAL	White, *Light from Ancient Letters*†
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LEC	Library of Early Christianity
Lietzmann, *an die Römer*	Lietzmann, *Einführung in die Textgeschichte der Paulusbriefe; An die Römer* (HNT)*
LIMC	Ackerman and Gisler, *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae**
Lohse, *an die Römer*	Lohse, *Der Brief an die Römer* (KEK)*
Long/Sedley	Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*†
LSJ	Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon**
LXX	Septuagint
MNTC	Moffatt New Testament Commentary
MnemSup	*Mnemosyne* Supplement Series
Moo, *Romans*	Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT)
MS(S)	Manscript(s)
MT	Masoretic text
NAB	New American Bible
NEB	New English Bible
NIB	*New Interpreter's Bible*
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIV	New International Version

NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NovTSup	*Novum Testamentum* Supplement Series
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NTAbh	Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen
NTD	Das Neue Testament Deutsch
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
NTTS	New Testament Tools and Studies
OCD	Hornblower and Spawforth, *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd ed.)*
OCT	Oxford Classical Texts
OLD	Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary**
OTP	Charlesworth, *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*†
PG	Migne, *Patrologia graeca**
PGL	Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon**
PGM	Preisendanz and Henrichs, *Papyri graecae magicae*†
PKGK	Staab, *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*†
PVTG	Pseudepigrapha veteris testamenti graecae
RG	Spengel, *Rhetores graeci*†
RG-W	Walz, *Rhetores graeci*†
RGG^4	Betz, ed., *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (4th ed.)*
RLM	Halm, *Rhetores latini minores*†
Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*	Sanday and Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC)*
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLRBS	Society of Biblical Literature Resources for Biblical Study
SBLSBS	Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
SBLTT	Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations
SBLWGRW	Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Romans World
SD	Studies and Documents
Schlier, *Römerbrief*	Schlier, *Der Römerbrief* (HTKNT)*
Schmithals, *Römerbrief*	Schmithals, *Der Römerbrief**
Smyth	Smyth, *Greek Grammar**
SNT	Studien zum Neuen Testament
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SBT	Studies in Biblical Theology
SGRR	Studies in Greek and Roman Religion
STAC	Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum
Stuhlmacher, *Romans*	Stuhlmacher, *Paul's Letter to the Romans**
SVF	Von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*†
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
TDNT	Kittel and Friedrich, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament**
Teubner	Biblioteca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum teubneriana
TDOT	*Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament**
TLG	Thesaurus linguae graecae
Totti	Totti, *Ausgewählte Texte der Isis- und Serapis-Religion*†
TSAJ	Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum
UUA	Uppsala Universitetsårskrift
VL	Vetus latina
Wilckens, *an die Römer*	Wilckens, *Der Brief an die Römer* (EKKNT)*
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the seventeenth chapter of the book of Acts, the author poses an intriguing question: what if Paul, the great evangelist and hero of his narrative, were to have met and conversed with the eminent philosophers of his day? 'Luke' contrives a scenario wherein Paul has occasion to stop over in Athens while he awaits the arrival of his colleagues. Never one to waste an opportunity, Paul frequents the synagogues and street corners proclaiming the gospel. Meanwhile he notices with distress that Athens is κατείδωλος, "covered in idols." He also encounters other famous residents of the city, Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. Upon hearing his message, they describe him and it variously. He is a σπερμολόγος and a ξένων δαιμονίων καταγγελεύς, and the gospel a καινὴ διδαχή and ξενίζοντά τινα (17:18–20). They are obviously struggling to fit the square peg of the gospel into the round holes of phenomena more familiar to them. Surmising that Paul proclaims a foreign mystery cult, they ask: δυνάμεθα γνῶναι; βουλόμεθα οὖν γνῶναι τίνα θέλει ταῦτα εἶναι.

Luke humorously presents the philosophers as supercilious fad-chasers (17:21), but his characters in fact pose a serious question: if one were to ask the real Paul to elaborate what the gospel is in philosophical terms, how would he respond? The speech in Acts 17 lays out the gospel's origins in the action of a benevolent, if unknown, God "who made the world and all things in it" (ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, v. 24). He sketches the principles of philosophical piety which his audience would presumably likewise endorse, and then reaches the heart of the matter in vv. 30–31:

30 τοὺς μὲν οὖν χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεριδὼν ὁ θεὸς, τὰ νῦν παραγγέλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντας πανταχοῦ μετανοεῖν, 31 καθότι ἔστησεν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾧ ὥρισεν, πίστιν παρασχὼν πᾶσιν ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν.

30 Therefore God, after overlooking the times of ignorance, now commands humanity that all people everywhere must repent, 31 because he has fixed the day on which he is about to judge the universe with justice by a man whom he designated, furnishing proof to all by raising him from the dead.

Luke's Paul gives here a succinct summary of the gospel, a statement of the proclamation in a nutshell. He does not lay out the summary as a definition (the gospel is *a*, *b*, and *c*), but it could easily serve in lieu of a definition. He futhermore uses the verb ὁρίζειν which regularly occurs with the meaning "to

define." Although the transition to vv. 30–31 may seem abrupt at first glance, it gathers previous parts of the speech through the concise repetition of key concepts.[1] His speech up to this point has dealt with the primordial past and the present, but now it looks ahead to the day of the judgment which God will execute with the assistance of Christ. In vv. 30–31, 'Paul' also abbreviates narrative elements of the gospel (Jesus' death, resurrection, and appointment) and eschatological ideas. If his audience were to have permitted him to continue his speech, he would presumably have unpacked this compression further,[2] but he collides with their skepticism regarding the possibility of resurrection (ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν, 17:32). Luke's Paul therefore gives in vv. 30–31 a concise and content-rich statement of the gospel's essence. As a part of the speech, the statement locates the gospel within a framework of philosophical piety, of worship properly rendered to a supramundane God, and merges this framework with the narrative of what God has done through Christ.

Luke's 'what-if' is in no way an idle question. It persists today in the continuing debates regarding the historical Paul's education and engagement with his Greco-Roman polytheistic environment. In spite of the protestations in his correspondence with the Corinthians to have little interest in the orator's elegances of style or the philosopher's lofty speculations and procedures (1 Cor 1:18–2:5), Paul's authentic letters recognizably draw from the vast fund of rhetorical techniques and philosophical methods of his day. He does not regard himself, of course, as foremost an orator or a philosopher. His identity as ἀπόστολος with a God-given responsibility to proclaim the gospel puts him in an altogether different category. He nonetheless wields the tools available to him to achieve his objectives, and he can 'switch hats' with bewildering suddenness. For example, in 1 Corinthians 15 he starts by reprising his role as an instructor in basic traditions (his readers' μυσταγωγός, as it were), then shifts to philosophical argumentation to defeat a proposition (ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν) and to establish the kind of σῶμα that the resurrected dead will have,[3]

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[1] Χρόνους in v. 30 recalls God's establishment of προστεταγμένους καιρούς in v. 26. Τῆς ἀγνοίας captures the blind groping after God in v. 27 (εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν). With θεός 'Paul' concisely inserts his elaboration of the ἄγνωστος θεός in vv. 23–25, and with πάντας παντχοῦ the universalism of vv. 28–29, especially γένος οὖν ὑπάρχοντες θεοῦ. In v. 31, we find similar compressions: again, God's power to set times in ἔστησεν ἡμέραν; οἰκουμένη as the boundaries of human habitation (κατοικεῖν, κατοικίαν, v. 26); and the selection of a single person (ἐποίησέν τε ἐξ ἑνὸς πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων) and his appointment (ὁρίσας, v. 26).

[2] Luke may provide a signal that Paul has more to say with τά in the phrase τὰ νῦν παραγγέλλει, which might mean: "he now commands the following things…." He is able to mention only the first because his audience interrupts him. On the other hand, τὰ νῦν may just mean "now" (so BDAG 681–82, s.v. νῦν, 2b).

[3] On philosophical argumentation in 1 Corinthians 15, see esp. Martin, *Corinthian Body*; Asher, *Polarity and Change*.

and along the way he discloses new "mysteries" as a prophet of the Parousia. He would not adopt these postures if he did not believe that they would work – in other words, that his addressees would regard the roles of transmitter of tradition, philosophical instructor, and prophet as both authoritative and familiar. Paul is clearly building upon the kinds of activities in which he was engaged when he was previously among the Corinthian Christians.

In the case of his letter to the Romans, he has no personal history with the majority of his audience. This does not mean, however, that the Roman Christians have no preconceptions of him. The fact that he goes back over territory which he covers in other contexts (particularly in Galatians and 1 Corinthians) strongly implies that he needs to do so, that the Roman Christians have heard about these arguments (or perhaps even read excerpts of them) from those who view him with suspicion or hostility.[4] His audience may thus have formed an unfavorable impression of him and his gospel. He must select his approach with great care if he will neutralize the residual negativity that may accompany his reputation, and make a new impression. The accomplishment of whatever goals he may have in writing to them – by no means a settled question among interpreters today – depends upon his audience's willingness to credit his authority as ἀπόστολος, to accept the validity of his previous evangelistic labors, and most of all to regard him as worth listening to.[5] He does not tell them of his call and commission (Gal 1:11–17), or of his accomplishments λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, ἐν δυνάμει σημείων καὶ τεράτων, ἐν δυνάμει πνεύματος (Rom 15:18–19). Instead, he sends his letter as we have it before us.

Paul firmly indicates both the direction that the argument will go and the 'hat' that he elects to wear in the introductory sections of the letter. He appropriates therein a genre which properly has its home in Greco-Roman philosophy, but which enjoys widespread application in rhetorical contexts as well, namely *definition* (ὅρος). At the beginning and end of his introduction (προοίμιον), he offers two distinct definitions of the gospel. He folds the first (1:2–4) into the prescript. The second doubles as his thesis statement (πρόθεσις, 1:16–17), declaring in brief compass the entirety of the argument of Romans. In the present study I investigate these two definitions of the gospel: how Paul composes them, coordinates them, and deploys them in his argument. My thesis here has four components: (1) that vv. 2–4 and 16–17 comprise two coordinated definitions of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, the former articulating *what it is* in terms of its content, and the latter *what it does* in terms of its function; (2) that Paul

[4] Romans 4 takes up the theme of Abraham's faith from Gal 3:6–18, and Romans 14–15 deal with the "weak" and the "strong," topics that he discusses in 1 Corinthians 8–9. Romans 2–3 also explain why the law cannot solve the problem of universal human culpability (cf. Gal 2:15–21). Also, the slander to which he refers in Rom 3:8 is more than rhetorical dressing: such portrayals of him and his gospel represent the kinds of things he expects the Romans to have heard.

[5] So also Stuhlmacher, "Apostle Paul's View of Righteousness," 76–77.

achieves the brevity necessary for definition with the rhetorical figures of συνεκδοχή (synecdoche), ἔλλειψις (omission), and ἀπὸ κοινοῦ (commonality); (3) that he deliberately invests vv. 16–17 with exploitable ambiguities in both the terminology and syntax; and (4) that his arguments proceed in part by 'exegeting the terms' of his essential and functional definitions, recombining their elements and maximizing the lexical meanings of their component terms along with their cognates toward a demonstration of how the gospel is God's δύναμις at work in the cosmos.

Scholars have occasionally noted that 1:2–4 and 16–17 are definitions,[6] although none has yet fully explored the implications that accompany this correct observation.[7] Ancient authors discuss definition at length, specifying what it is and what it should do, in both philosophical and rhetorical theoretical contexts. These discussions have direct bearing upon the composition of Paul's definitions of the gospel, so in chapter 2 I examine the theories of definition and study how orators use them in their speeches. One major conclu-

[6] E.g., Jewett (*Romans*, 99) calls 1:2–4 a "confessional definition of the gospel," but does not elaborate "definition" further. Similarly, vv. 16b and 17 each provide "a definition of the preceding contention about Paul not being ashamed of 'the gospel'" (ibid., 136). Again, Jewett leaves this point undeveloped. Stuhlmacher (*Romans*, 22) remarkably describes Rom "1:1ff." and 16–17 as a "twofold definition of the gospel"; see also idem, "Apostle Paul's View of Righteousness," 77–78. On Rom 1:16–17, Betz ("Christianity as Religion," 212–15) offers a short but incisive discussion of "the definition of the gospel." Note also that Betz approaches 12:1–2 as "two definitional statements," the first "of religion as voluntary self-sacrifice," and the second of "the apostle's concept of ethics" (ibid., 229–30; cf. idem, "Foundation of Christian Ethics"). Cf. Anderson (*Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 216), who, on the basis of the ancient division of treatises into the categories of θέσις ("an argumentative treatment of the theme lacking the specifics of person and circumstances") and ὑπόθεσις ("an argumentative treatment of a specific case"), observes: "[I]t becomes clear that the theme of the letter to the Romans … is much more reminiscent of a θέσις than a ὑπόθεσις. At that, it is much more reminiscent of a *philosophical* θέσις, than a rhetorical θέσις (which tended to deal with matters of public policy)."

[7] Scholars also rarely consider these two passages in light of each other. According to Bornkamm (*Paul*, 248–49), 1:3–4 "reproduces the Christology of the early (Jewish Christian) church," while 1:16–17 "is primitive Pauline and, unlike the purely Christological credo, is formulated in soteriological terms." "Both formulations," he continues, "are full and complete statements of the faith; they do not select from the gospel, the one the one thing and the other the other." Regarding the relationship between them, Bornkamm discounts the notion that "Paul quoted the traditional formula only in order to prove his orthodoxy." "The answer is not to be found in the (traditional) motif of Jesus as son of David …, but rather in the honorific title 'Son of God'…." The soteriological event of the resurrection of Christ as God's *Son* plays out in what Christians are called to be: not "Christs" but "sons" and "heirs": "While these connections are not made explicit in Romans 1, as Paul understood it, 1:3 f. points forward to 1:16 f., and conversely, 1:16 f. points back to the credo as Paul reinterpreted it." Cf. also Fee (*Pauline Christology*, 240): "Verses 3–4 turn out to be one of the two places in the prooemium (1:1–17) where the gospel is given content." He contrasts vv. 3–4 and 16–17 based upon the christological emphasis of the former and the soteriological emphasis of the latter.

sion of this chapter is that definitions should be *brief*. In order to achieve the necessary brevity, authors have at their disposal another body of theoretical literature, which is devoted to techniques of condensing complex ideas into extremely concise statements. These tactics help authors to compress, and readers to decompress, definitions and other kinds of discourse that require brevity. Chapter 3 thus investigates methods of brevity, paying special attention to the rhetorical figures of ἔλλειψις, συνεκδοχή and ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, since Paul uses these figures to load his definitions of the gospel with implied content and multiple layers of meaning. In chapter 4, I analyze Rom 1:2–4, his first definition of the gospel, which declares *what it is*. It is that …

… 2 ὃ προεπηγγείλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις 3 περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, 4 τοῦ ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.

… 2 which he [God] pre-proclaimed through his prophets in holy scriptures 3 concerning his Son, who was born from the seed of David according to the flesh, 4 who was appointed Son of God in power according to his spirit of holiness from his resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord.

Research on these verses generally focuses upon their alleged inclusion of a 'pre-Pauline formula,' a hymnic or confessional fragment that scholars surmise Paul to have quoted or adapted. I argue instead that Paul composes them himself, using a literary form that often appears in hymns (the 'mythological expanded epithet'), thereby imparting to his first definition a hymnic flavor. With the rhetorical figure of συνεκδοχή, the definition gathers the entirety of scripture's testimony regarding Christ, and compresses the gospel's narrative content into a statement that describes him both temporally (his ἀρχή and τέλος) and anthropologically (his σάρξ and πνεῦμα). In chapter 5, I turn to Paul's careful composition of his second definition (1:16–17), which specifies the function of the gospel: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is God's power for salvation for everyone who believes, for both the Jew first and the Greek" (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι). The definition also includes in v. 17 an abbreviated proof explaining how it can be God's δύναμις εἰς σωτηρίαν: "For God's justice is revealed in it from faith to faith, just as it has been written, 'The just one will live from faith'" (δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται, «ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται»). Paul designs vv. 16–17 as a statement of the gospel's cosmic function that makes sense in its context, that secures provisional endorsement from his addressees, and that invites the exposition which he will deliver in subsequent chapters. He futhermore takes full advantage of the ambiguities of meaning in some of the definition's key terms, particularly δύναμις, πίστις/πιστεύειν, and δικαιοσύνη. The ambiguity stands out especially in the difficult phrase ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν. Patristic readers of these verses

often perceive Paul to have omitted some words (i.e., to have deployed the figure of ἔλλειψις), a helpful clue that I pursue at length. In chapter 6, I conclude the study with a brief examination of Paul's exegesis of the terms of the definition which he accomplishes by bringing forward their different meanings and recombining them to explore their implications.

Luke's 'what-if,' as projected in his narrative of Paul's visit to Athens, remains a product of his imagination, a hypothetical placement of Paul into a scenario where he delivers a speech to an audience of philosophers, adopts a persona as one of their peers, and explains the gospel in terms that they would recognize. In creating this scene, however, Luke builds upon a foundation laid by the apostle himself. Paul appropriates a philosophical mode of discourse in the opening sections of his letter to the Romans, wherein he also establishes his ἦθος and previews his themes and procedures. In setting forth his definitions of the gospel, he does not cast his addressees in the role of philosophers. But he certainly portrays them as more than capable of considering questions at a high intellectual level – as σοφοί, in other words, μεστοί … ἀγαθωσύνης, πεπληρωμένοι πάσης [τῆς] γνώσεως, δυνάμενοι καὶ ἀλλήλους νουθετεῖν (15:14). It would be utterly incorrect to reduce Romans to a philosophical monograph. Yet it nonetheless partakes of some of the features of such texts. The investigation of how it does so in 1:1–17 and in its arguments that unpack elements of its two definitions of the gospel is my overall aim.

Any research into even the smallest aspect of Paul's letter to the Romans draws the student into protracted scholarly debates that, if he or she is not careful, can take over the project and distract from its proper objectives and scope. I must therefore operate on the basis of a set of assumptions: that the letter dates to the mid-to-late 50's C.E. and was probably written at Corinth;[8] that it is unitary and has survived without major interpolations that textual critics have failed to detect;[9] that its intended audience is the one that he spe-

[8] Such is the conclusion of the vast majority of scholars who have considered the question; see, e.g., Kümmel, *Introduction*, 311; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 85–87; Jewett, *Romans*, 18–22; Dunn, *Romans*, xliii–iv.

[9] Contra O'Neill, *Paul's Letter to the Romans*, esp. his introduction, 11–22; also Walker, *Interpolations*. Schmithals' thesis that Romans is a composite letter has won little acceptance (see *Römerbrief*, 29 for his breakdown of the letter). The main dispute pertains to Romans 16, regarding which see Manson, "St. Paul's Letter to the Romans," who concludes: "We must then suppose that Paul prepared a letter (Rom. 1–15) and sent it to Rome. At the same time a copy was prepared to be sent to Ephesus. It may be assumed that this Ephesian copy would include the personalia of Rom. 15:14–33; for these, though primarily intended for the Roman church, nevertheless, contained information about Paul's plans which would be of interest to the Apostle's friends in Ephesus. … Consequently all we have here in chapter 16 is an introduction to Phoebe, who may be regarded as the bearer of the letter to Ephesus; the greetings to Paul's friends in the province of Asia; and the exhortation of verses 17–20, which has points of contact with Paul's address to the Ephesian elders at Miletus [Acts 20:17–30]" (13). Many of Manson's points in this essay are persuasive, but I cannot understand why chapter 16, if it indeed went to Ephesus but not Rome, lacks its own epistolary prescript – in other

cifically identifies, Rome;[10] and that the ethnic composition of this audience is primarily Gentile.[11] I also presuppose that historical criticism remains the optimal method of investigating questions of the kind that I have set forth.[12] My application of the ancient sources regarding philosophy, rhetoric and epistolography toward an accurate understanding of Paul's compositional strategies is indeed a prominent feature of historical criticism as I practice it in this study.[13] I deliberately avoid the debates regarding the genre, internal structure,

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words, why an editor would have wanted to obliterate a clear indication that Romans 16 belongs with the main letter but is addressed to Ephesus. When I weigh the plausibility of an excised prescript against the plausibility that he could have indeed known so many people at Rome (cf. ibid., 12–13), I incline toward the latter. See also Koester, *Introduction*, 2.143, and cf. the responses to Manson's thesis by Donfried, "Short Note"; Gamble, *Textual History*, 36–55; Wedderburn, *Reasons for Romans*, 12–18; Lampe, "The Roman Christians of Romans 16" and *From Paul to Valentinus*, 153–83.

[10] Contra Jervell, "Letter to Jerusalem."

[11] So, e.g., Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*, 200–209; Nanos, *Mystery of Romans*, 75–84; Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics*, 185–86. Contra, e.g., Cranfield, *Romans*, 1.67–68; Campbell, *Rhetoric of Righteousness*, 14–19; Guerra, *Romans and the Apologetic Tradition*, 22–42; Watson, *Paul, Judaisim, and the Gentiles*, 163–91. See Rom 1:5–6 (ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν … ἐν οἷς ἐστε καὶ ὑμεῖς κλητοί); 1:13 (ἵνα τινὰ καρπὸν σχῶ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν καθὼς καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν); and 11:13 (ὑμῖν δὲ λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν). In 7:1 (γινώσκουσιν γὰρ νόμον λαλῶ) Paul does not need to be implying that he addresses Jews or Jewish Christians *per se*, since in other contexts in which he indisputably addresses Gentiles (e.g., Galatians 3–4) he still presumes a high level of familiarity with the scriptures. The mixed ethnic composition of the Roman congregations is a central component of the hypothesis that Paul sends his letter in order to intervene in a conflict (see esp. Donfried, "Short Note" and "False Presuppositions"; Minear, *Obedience of Faith*; Watson, "Two Roman Congregations" and *Paul, Judaisim, and the Gentiles*, 163–91, and throughout the interpretation of Romans in subsequent chapters; Jewett, *Romans*, 46–74; and many others).

[12] Loudly trumpeted announcements of the demise of historical criticism by advocates of 'postmodernist' criticisms have evidently proven premature, as Aichele, Miscall and Walsh tacitly acknowledge in their recent article, "An Elephant in the Room." Historical critical research continues unabated across the broad spectrum of international scholarship on the New Testament and early Christian literature.

[13] All historically based rhetorical studies stand on the shoulders of Hans Dieter Betz and his 1979 Hermeneia commentary on Galatians, which reacquainted scholars with the ancient literature on this subject. Troy Martin has written a study, "Invention and Arrangement in Recent Pauline Rhetorical Studies" (presently unpublished), which exhaustively details this history of scholarship since 1979. The main complaints about Betz's and his followers' methodology pertain to the limitation of 'rhetorical criticism' to ancient sources, and the setting aside of contemporary rhetorical theory; Margaret M. Mitchell has written succint responses to such complaints (*Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 6–8, with references to the secondary literature; also "Rhetorical and New Literary Criticism," 620–26) which I can wholeheartedly endorse, so I will not address the matter further here. Others object from a different angle. Anderson (*Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 249–57) concludes that one cannot properly apply ancient rhetorical genres and τάξις-theory to the analysis of Paul's letters, but he detects a rich usage of tropes and figures, which does not need to have derived from formal rhetorical education (which would somehow contaminate him, cf. ibid., 249–50), since "[t]he use of tropes and figures is … common to all literate societies (254). My research here, in which I

and purpose(s) of the letter, beyond the carefully limited remarks on this topic I offer above and in chapter 7 below. My conclusions certainly have an impact upon answers to these difficult questions, but would require full studies of their own to argue well, instead of the incomplete treatments necessitated by the scope of the present project. I thus strive to maintain a tight focus on determinations of how Paul composes his definitions, what they mean and what he wants them to do in chapter 1, and how he deploys them elsewhere in his letter. These questions involve more than their share of intrusions into disputed areas of research (particularly on πίστις and δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ) even as they demand engagement with areas of ancient literature that may be unfamiliar to some interpreters of the New Testament. With these caveats in place, I now turn to the ancient sources on definition and on brevity.

interact at length with the ancient sources on style, should not be understood as supporting Anderson's or similar conclusions (see, e.g., Porter, "Theoretical Justification" and "Ancient Rhetorical Analysis," esp. the literature cited in the latter at 251, n. 2; cf. the review of Anderson's book by Mitchell, *CBQ* 60 [1998]: 356–58).

Chapter 2

The Features and Functions of Definition in Ancient Philosophy and Rhetoric

2.1 Introduction

In this first stage of my study, I introduce the ancient literature regarding what a definition (ὅρος, ὁρισμός, ὁρίζειν)[1] is, and the kinds of things that philosophers and orators thought it properly to do. Definition as we normally encounter it nowadays is a species of predicative statement (*x* is *a*, *b*, and *c*), recognized mainly through the context in which it appears. To take the most obvious example, if one were to receive a page of alphabetized words followed by short, enumerated statements, one would instantly know the page to come from a dictionary and the statements to be definitions of the words. In ordinary discourse, too, definition has a discernable tone and emphasis: with careful precision it specifies the meaning of a term so that it may serve as a conceptual anchor for working through a problem or for arguing a position.[2] As the questions under consideration become more complicated, the need for explicitly articulated definitions becomes more acute, and as a result they can become increasingly technical and dependent upon a broader knowledge of the subject. This spectrum of lesser or greater specificity and technicality likewise exists in ancient definitions, as well as in the theoretical texts that discuss them. Definition indeed belongs among the main tools of Greco-Roman philosophical investigation, so a great deal of thought went into establishing the principles which inform their composition and utilization. Some of these principles filter down into oratory and popular philosophy (by which I mean, texts on philosophical subjects directed to non-specialist audiences).

[1] Etymologically, ὅρος probably acquires the meaning "definition" in extension of its meanings "boundary" and "(de)limitation" (cf. the English word *horizon*). The sources use ὅρος and ὁρισμός without any discernable difference in valence; I typically use the former throughout as a convenience. See also the new volume edited by David Charles, *Definition in Greek Philosophy*, which appeared last year (2010).

[2] Definitions also provide a context for humor or pointed observations about human behavior, e.g., "Insanity is the repetition of a failed action with the expectation of a different outcome."

Sketching the outlines of these discussions as the background of Paul's definitions of the gospel is my objective in this chapter.

2.2 The foundation: Plato's *Phaedrus*

Theoretical discussions of definition begin in earnest in classical Athens.[3] Plato portrays Socrates and his interlocutors on numerous occasions erecting and then demolishing definitions as part of his method of ἔλεγχος.[4] Plato's treatment of the principles of ὅρος in the *Phaedrus* comes to exert wide influence over subsequent theory, so this text furnishes the logical place to begin.

The context is Socrates' first speech on love (ἔρως).[5] Earlier in the dialogue Phaedrus recites an oration by Lysias on this topic.[6] Socrates subjects this speech to rigorous criticism, and then accepts a challenge from Phaedrus

[3] Presocratic philosophers also occasionally use definitions or quasi-definitional statements. For example: "Anaximenes … said that boundless air is the origin, the thing from which the things that are coming into existence, that have come into existence, and that will come into existence, the gods and divinities, [all] come into existence, and the remainder are from the offspring of this element," Ἀναξιμένης ... ἀέρα ἄπειρον ἔφη τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα γινέσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῶν τούτου ἀπογόνων (Kirk/Raven 144, § 141). The passage goes on to identify the εἶδος of air, and to explain how it appears differently (i.e., as fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth) according to its density. Note the previous passage (ibid., § 140), describing the underlying nature, ἡ ὑποκειμένη φύσις (i.e., air) as οὐκ ἀόριστος but rather ὡρισμένη. Cf. also these technical descriptions of ψυχή, ἁρμονία and σῶμα: "They [Pythagoreans] say that it [the soul] is a kind of concord: for also [they say] that concord is the combination and synthesis of things which are opposed; and that the body is compounded from things opposed," ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων (Kirk/Raven 346, § 451, s.v. Philolaus). See further Kirk/Raven 362–64, § 476 (Anaxagoras on νοῦς); 442–43, § 603 (Diogenes of Apollonia on ἀήρ). As far as I know, no testimony survives regarding a Presocratic theoretical discussion on ὅρος; cf., however, Diogenes of Apollonia, whose treatise had the following opening lines: "It seems to me a necessity that the one who begins any speech render the beginning indisputable and the exposition plain and stately," λόγου παντὸς ἀρχόμενον δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἑρμηνείαν ἁπλῆν καὶ σεμνήν (Kirk/Raven 434, § 596). Plato evidently echoes this passage in the first speech on love in the *Phaedrus* discussed here.

[4] For an elaboration of this method and the place of definition within it, see Benson, "Priority of Definition."

[5] *Phaedr.* 237a–241d.

[6] The speech of Lysias appears at 230e–234c. The thesis (according to Phaedrus' summary) is that "favor is to be shown more to the man who is not in love than the one who is," λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἔρωντι (227c).

to deliver a speech more to his own liking.[7] His introduction (προοίμιον) explains why a definition of ἔρως should stand first in the order of business:

περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. … ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος οἵόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα, εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει.

In every situation, my boy, there is one starting point for those who are about to deliberate something well: one must know whatever topic the deliberation may be about, or complete error necessarily occurs. … But since there sits before you and me the subject of whether one should enter into friendship [εἰς φιλίαν] more with the one who loves [ἐρῶντι] than the one who does not, after assigning by agreement a definition regarding love – what sort of thing it is and what power it has – let us examine whether love causes benefit or injury by reviewing and referring to this. (*Phaedr.* 237c–d)

Several important points emerge out of Socrates' introductory statements here. First, a definition needs to declare *what something is* and *what function it has* (οἵόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν): such is his basic ὅρος τοῦ ὅρου. Second, it serves to *secure agreement* (ὁμολογία) between interlocutors on the terms of a deliberation (βουλή) toward the avoidance of error. One may "review and refer to" it throughout the inquiry (ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες) as something clearly articulated by the speaker and endorsed by the audience. Third, he identifies definition as a preliminary step, so he places his inquiry into the nature and function of ἔρως in the προοίμιον of his speech. Fourth, Socrates implicitly divides the investigative process into its constituent parts: the question, the definition of concepts within the question, the proposition, and the argument. Socrates and Phaedrus have before them questions to consider. Should one prefer a suitor who is in love, or one who is not? Does love produce benefit or harm? Answers to these questions – the formulation of propositions and their verification in argument – require an answer to a prior question: what is love? As Socrates looks back on his speech later in the dialogue, he identifies his method's two foundational tasks: first, "to bring into a single idea widely dispersed phenomena by viewing them together, in order that by defininining each item regarding which one wants at that point to teach, one

[7] Socrates puts some distance between himself and the perspectives expressed in his speech with a narrative prelude (237b): "So once upon a time there was a very beautiful boy, rather a lad, and for him there were very many lovers. Now a certain one of these men was wily, who – although he loved him no less than anyone else – had convinced the boy that he was not in love. And one time as he was pleading with him, he was addressing this very point, that he ought to favor the one who is not in love instead of the one who is, and he was speaking as follows…." ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν αἱμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς οὐκ ἐρῴη. καί ποτε αὐτὸν αἰτῶν ἔπειθεν τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὧδε.

may make it clear" (εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ); and second, "to be able again to dissect things according to their kinds – according to the joints, where they have naturally occurred" (τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκε).[8] Definition thus works constructively, by "assembly" (συναγωγή), while dissection works analytically, by division (διαίρεσις) and classification (κατ' εἴδη).

A quick overview of the remainder of the προοίμιον of the speech will illustrate how these two tasks of assembly and division coordinate in practice. Socrates first identifies a self-evident feature: "Surely then it is clear to everyone that love is a kind of desire" (ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως, ἅπαντι δῆλον). "Desire" covers broader territory than "love" since all people (even οἱ μὴ ἐρῶντες) experience the former; the question rather hinges on who acts upon it. Socrates next explains two internal impulses, the innate desire for pleasures and an acquired opinion of what is best (ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀριστοῦ).[9] He then elaborates the names which accompany these conditions:

δοξῆς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη.

Indeed when the opinion guides by rationality to what is best and dominates, the name of this dominance is 'temperance.' But when desire irrationally draws us to pleasures and governs in us, the name 'hybris' is given to this governance. (*Phaedr.* 238a)

Socrates is implementing the procedure of διαίρεσις, dividing desire into two species, σωφροσύνη, in which it is dominated by rationality, and ὕβρις, in which it irrationally dominates. One may easily see where he is driving: ἔρως will become one of the sub-species of ὕβρις. Before taking this step, however, he elaborates other phenomena at the same taxonomic level:

ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον – πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές – καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδέων ἐκπρεπὴς ἥ ἂν τύχῃ γενομένη, τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, οὔτε τινὰ καλὴν οὔτ'

[8] *Phaedr.* 265d–e. The Stranger links διαίρεσις with διαλεκτικὴ ἐπιστήμη at *Soph.* 253d–e.

[9] *Phaedr.* 237d–e: "But we know that furthermore even the ones who do not love desire the beautiful. On what basis then shall we differentiate the one who loves from the one who does not? It is necessary moreover to perceive that in each of us there are two types that govern and guide, which we follow wherever they guide: one, the desire for pleasures which is innate, and the other, an acquired opinion which aims at what is best. Sometimes these are of a single mind in us, but there are occasions when they quarrel. And sometimes one dominates us, but at other times the other." ὅτι δ' αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν. τῷ δὴ τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἑπόμεθα ᾗ ἂν ἄγητον, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀριστοῦ. τούτω δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμονοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα κρατεῖ.

ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται· περὶ δ' αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος· καὶ τἆλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης ᾗ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον.

But then hybris has many names, for it has many parts and forms. And of these forms, whichever one happens to become pre-eminent imparts its own moniker to the one who experiences it when he is called by name, with the result that he has acquired it as something neither beautiful nor worth mentioning. For, in the case of food, when desire for it dominates the best reasoning and the other desires, it becomes gluttony and it will impart this name [glutton] to the very one experiencing it when he is called. And again, in the case of strong wines, when desire plays the tyrant and guides the one who has acquired it, it is clear what sort of designation he will ultimately obtain. And indeed, with respect to the related names of these and related desires, when one perpetually dominates it is completely clear by which desire it is proper [for someone] to be called. (*Phaedr.* 238a–b)

Socrates characterizes the types of hybristic desire as forces which compel anyone in their grip toward the reception of the name which they themselves carry, reducing people to mere unflattering labels. The identification of these species and their undesirable results together form an argument by analogy which Socrates then brings to a conclusion in his final definition:

ἧς δ' ἕνεκα πάντα τὸ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πάντως σαφέστερον· ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

The reason that all the above has been said is already fairly evident, but something said is more clear than something not said in its entirety. For the desire that conquers without reason an opinion that goes for what is right, which was guided toward the pleasure of beauty, and which furthermore was vigorously strengthened by desires akin to itself toward the beauty of bodies, which conquers by guiding, which takes its moniker from this very force, was called love. (*Phaedr.* 238b–c)

Each clause of the definition gathers up and condenses concepts from the foregoing discussion: the doctrine of the two impulses (ἄνευ λόγου ἐπιθυμία, and δόξα ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσα); the dominance of desire over the reason (κρατήσασα, πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους and νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ); and Socrates' interest in the transference of names (ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, supposing that ἔρως is derived from ῥώννυσθαι or ῥώεσθαι).[10] Both the definition and the discussion building up to it exhibit an obvious slant toward Socrates' proposition that one should prefer a suitor who is not in love. This bias clashes ironically with the claims made earlier about the necessity of ac-

[10] Dionysius of Halicarnassus complains of the lack of brevity in this definition, of Plato's "drawing out so large a roundabout statement when the subject is able to be encompassed in a few words," καὶ τοσαύτην ἐκμηκύνας περίφρασιν ὀλίγοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι δυναμένου περιληφθῆναι πράγματος (*Dem.* 7).

curate definitions, and paves the way for Socrates' retraction of the speech as impious and his replacement of it later in the dialogue. Explicit references to the definition scarcely appear in the rest of the speech; instead, it works – particularly in its negativity – as the foundation upon which Socrates makes his case. How could love so defined not lead to the conclusion that it causes harm to the beloved, and that the handsome παῖς should thus prefer an uninfatuated suitor? Socrates relentlessly accents the damages an infatuated lover bestows upon the beloved, and omits a case in favor of his proposition altogether – hence Phaedrus' protestation when he stops: "I thought [the speech] was only halfway through" (ᾠμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν).[11]

Whereas in other contexts Plato has Socrates use definition in a less playful manner, to place the definiendum on a taxonomic map of related phenomena developed through lengthy dialogue,[12] in the first speech on love in the

[11] *Phaedr.* 241d: "And yet I thought [the speech] was halfway through, and that it should speak equally regarding the one who is not in love, how it is necessary to show him more favor, stating moreover what good qualities he has. But why, Socrates, are you stopping now?" καίτοι ᾠμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὅσα αὖ ἔχει ἀγαθά· νῦν δὲ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύει;

[12] E.g., Plato, *Soph.* 218b–c: "But you, in common with me, must now make an inquiry, beginning first (as it appears right to me) with the sophist, investigating and explaining with argument what sort of thing he is. For presently regarding this person you and I hold in common only the name, but the thing that we call upon [with the name] each of us may perhaps hold in our own minds privately. But it is always necessary that the matter itself have been agreed upon regarding every detail through arguments rather than the name alone without argument." κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ σοι συσκεπτέον ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ, τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτερος ταχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν· δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνωμολογῆσθαι χωρὶς λόγου. Definition as practiced by the Stranger in this dialogue first involves development of a taxonomic tree. A definition then moves from the top to the bottom of the tree, from the general to the specific, e.g. the art of fishing (221a–b): "Now then, regarding the fisherman's art both you and I have together agreed upon not only the name, but we have also sufficiently obtained the statement regarding its very function. For, of the art as a whole, half was the acquisitive part; and of the acquisitive half was the part that subdues others; and of the subduing part half was the hunting part; and of the hunting part half was the part that pursues animals; and of the pursuing part half was the part that pursues water creatures; and of the water-creature part the division below that was the fishing part as a whole; of the fishing part half was the striking part; and of the striking part, half was the part that uses fishhooks. Now of this part there is that part concerning the strike which draws [πληγὴ ἀνασπωμένη] upwards from below; the name, having taken its likeness from this very action, has now become 'the fisherman's art' [ἀσπαλιευτική], as it is known, which was sought by us." νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ τε κἀγὼ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοὔνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς. συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζῳοθηρικόν, ζῳοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλον ἁλιευτικόν, ἁλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπωμένην, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν τοὔνομα, ἡ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθεῖσα ἐπίκλην γέ-