

FRANÇOIS BOVON

New Testament
and Christian Apocrypha

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen

zum Neuen Testament

237

Mohr Siebeck

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Herausgeber/Editor
Jörg Frey (München)

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237



François Bovon

New Testament
and Christian Apocrypha

Collected Studies II

edited by

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Mohr Siebeck

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e-ISBN PDF 978-3-16-151526-2

ISBN 978-3-16-149050-7

ISSN 0512-1604 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament)

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

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The book was typeset and printed by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier.

Preface

Five years after my first collection of essays published by Mohr Siebeck, *Studies in Early Christianity*, I am pleased to offer a second volume of collected papers. Ten of them appear here for the first time in English and have been translated from the French with enthusiasm by Jonathan Von Kodar and Diane Marie Cole. My first duty and intention is to thank both of them warmly for the time, the energy, and the competence they have given me. My thanks are also due to Stephen Hebert, who scanned the English articles and put them into a common file format.

I would like also to express my gratitude to Professor Jörg Frey and Dr. Henning Ziebritzki. The first, editor of the series, and the second, Theology Editor at Mohr Siebeck, have both shown an interest in my work that not only surprised me but moved me deeply. I am also grateful to Ms. Ilse König from Mohr Siebeck, who did such a good job as copy editor.

My friend Professor Bertrand Bouvier has looked at all the Greek quotations, and his famous accuracy has found some wrong breathing marks and—what is worse—some misplaced accents. I am also grateful to him.

This book would not have seen the light without Glenn E. Snyder's collaboration. His role has been so decisive that I asked the publisher to add his name as editor to the title page. Glenn, who is currently writing a dissertation on the *Acts of Paul*, took the time to check the translations and scannings, harmonize the abbreviations, coordinate the whole matter, and prepare the indices. His kindness and his competence have produced marvelous fruits. I thank him with all my heart.

In the course of my academic career I have trodden on two fields, the New Testament and Christian apocryphal literature. It is therefore not surprising that here, as in the first volume and in my *New Testament Traditions and Apocryphal Narratives* (trans. Jane Haapiseva-Hunter; Princeton Theological Monograph Series 26; Allison Park, Pa.: Pickwick, 1995), I brought together papers devoted to these two complexes of religious literature.

I am using in the Table of Contents the term "Transitions," for I believe that there have been changes in literary form and theological thinking in the first decades of Christianity, as well as in the following centuries. But I am also convinced that these changes were not εἰς ἄλλο γένος. There were always continuity and kinship despite the changes and differences. "Transition"

therefore seemed the appropriate word for evoking such transformation without break.

I did not update these essays, and I apologize for that. Dialogue with more recent research on the same topic would have forced me to add developments that I have not the energy to spend now and that the book would not have the wish to accommodate. The dates of original publication, going from 1970 to 2006, are therefore important.

Cambridge, MA, September 15, 2008

F. B.

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Part I
Early Transitions

“The Good” and “the Best” in Paul’s Thinking

Introduction

In recent years, the apostle Paul has often been ignored or attacked by scholars. In American scholarship the apostle has been eclipsed by Jesus. Preferring a reconstructed historical figure to literary sources, history over creed, many publishers promote innumerable books on the prophet from Nazareth, leaving his major spokesman to occupy the shady corner of omission. When he is not completely neglected,¹ Paul has fallen victim to several attacks: in a self-critical movement Christian theologians have reacted not only against the Augustinian, Lutheran, and Calvinist reception of Paul, but also against the most evident Pauline affirmations of election over works and grace over law. Other scholars reproach Paul, the Hebrew among Hebrews (Phil 3:5), for having willingly or unwillingly launched the theory of Christianity’s supersession of Judaism. Among the most critical are some feminist New Testament scholars, who dislike Paul altogether because of his patriarchal attitude toward women.

For the topic of this conference,² the most relevant conflict over interpretation turns on the apostle’s identity. While Daniel Boyarin wrote his book *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity*, Troels Engberg-Pedersen published a book entitled *Paul and the Stoics*. A conference organized in 2001 even suggested that the comfortable distinction between Judaism and Hellenism be questioned.

In choosing an ethical topic for my paper, I do not intend to neglect Paul’s theological concerns. I share with Rudolf Bultmann that the “message of the cross” is decisive in Paul’s thinking, that there is no paraenetic teaching without the kerygma. But I read the Pauline epistles with the conviction that the creed remains vain if there is no ethical embodiment, if righteousness by faith does not

¹ Strangely John Dominic Crossan willingly omits Paul’s letters from his reconstruction of the first years of Christianity. See John Dominic Crossan, *The Birth of Christianity* (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998). For a review of this book, see François Bovon, “A Critical Review of John Dominic Crossan’s *The Birth of Christianity*,” *HTR* 94 (2001) 369–74.

² St. Paul: Between Athens and Jerusalem, the 3rd International Philosophical Conference, Athens, 10–11 June 2004. See *St. Paul: Between Athens and Jerusalem: The 3rd International Philosophical Conference Proceedings, Athens, 10–11 June 2004* (ed. John Panteleimon Manousakakis; Athens: The American College of Greece, 2006). The title chosen for this conference is built on Tertullian’s famous sentence: “*Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?*” (*De praescriptione haereticorum*, 7.9).

bear the fruit of the Spirit, which is love, joy, peace, etc. (Gal 5:22–23). Presented within the framework of a colloquium entitled "St. Paul between Athens and Jerusalem," and not "between Jerusalem and Athens," my paper first will focus on a central aspect of Paul's ethical thinking: in practical matters Paul offered two solutions, one called "the good" and the other called "the better," with an expressed preference for the better. I will then suggest that such an ethical theory is embedded in an old Greek philosophical tradition, and that that tradition influenced Judaism in general and Paul in particular.

Although the three main examples I present here are all taken from Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, I will claim that such an ethical attitude is present throughout the Pauline corpus: it is present in 1 Thessalonians, the oldest Pauline letter we have, and it is still present in the epistle to the Romans, considered correctly since Günther Bornkamm's famous paper³ to be Paul's last will or testament.

In reviewing classical interpretations of Paul's ethics, I realized that the question of the origin of Paul's ethical thinking has often been the decisive one. After he analyzed Paul's anthropological presuppositions and the roots of behavior in his doctrine of redemption, Rudolf Schnackenburg⁴ demonstrated the struggles of early Christians who lived "between the times," between the first and second coming of Jesus the Messiah, underlining Paul's contribution to the construction of moral conscience. Schnackenburg's interpretation took into account the influence of both the Jewish and the Hellenistic worldviews.

In his history of the early Christian ethos, Herbert Preisker⁵ traced a continuous, historical line of development from Jesus to the first Christians, and from them to Paul. According to Preisker, even if the apostle is faithful to the eschatological presence of God in human time through the christological kerygma and the outpouring of the Spirit, he is forced to adapt his radical requirements to the human condition. To live in Christ becomes a prosaic reality but, Paul insists, his conception of the ethical life is different from – and even opposed to – the legalism of the Judaizers and the euphoric freedom of the Gnostics. According to Preisker's view of Paul, the Christian is at the same time both detached from the world and superior to the world (*weltgelöst* and *weltüberlegen*). Here also Paul's ethics is perceived in a historical context, albeit more precise than in the solution proposed by Schnackenburg.

³ Günther Bornkamm, "Der Römerbrief als Testament des Paulus," in *Geschichte und Glaube, zweiter Teil: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Band IV* (BEvT 53; Munich: Kaiser, 1971) 120–39.

⁴ Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Die sittliche Botschaft des Neuen Testaments* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; HTKNT Supplementbände 1–2; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1986–1988).

⁵ Herbert Preisker, *Das Ethos des Urchristentums* (2d ed.; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949; reprinted in Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968).

Rudolf Bultmann,⁶ to take a third example, presents Paul's ethical conception from a theological as well as historical perspective. He presents a dialectical, and not a chronological, interpretation of the famous pair "indicative" versus "imperative," placing the doctrinal indicative of redemption in the terminology of the mystery religions and the ethical imperative of commitment in the sphere of the Jewish morality. For Bultmann, ethics is another way of saying "doctrine." To be a Christian is to become what one is.

What these scholars neglected and what the attention of subsequent researchers failed to capture was what constitutes the heart of my own investigation: the Pauline unfurling of ethical solutions. The traditional Jewish – actually it is not only Jewish – opposition between the good and the bad is presented in the text of Deut 30:15–20, where the contrast between obedience and disobedience is expressed according to the opposition of life and death: "See, I have set before you today life and prosperity, death and adversity. If you obey the commandments of the LORD your God ... then you shall live ... But if your heart turns away and you do not hear ... you shall not live long in the land ..."

The apostle Paul offers a more complicated, more sophisticated view than this one: there is of course the decision he rejects, the sinful attitude, the path of the wicked; but for the righteous, there is first a good decision or way, followed by a second better one. In 1 Corinthians, for example, once he has reckoned the word of the cross and the knowledge of Jesus Christ – and only of Jesus Christ crucified – as the core of Christianity (1 Cor 1:18–2:5), he immediately adds that there is a superior wisdom possessed by those who are the perfect (1 Cor 2:6–16). Similarly, as soon as he prescribes a Christian attitude, he suggests a better one. Let me now present three examples of this structure of Paul's ethics, before I locate this Pauline conception in the field of ancient Greek philosophy and connect it to the apostle's vision of Christ and, as attested in the scriptures of Israel, his doctrine of God.

The Good, the Bad, and the Better

In our first example Paul considers himself to be responsible for the well-being of the Corinthian community. Hearing that when they are confronted with tensions and disagreements the Corinthian Christians bring their divergent opinions to secular, imperial courts for trial, he voices complete opposition to this solution: "When any of you has a grievance against another, do you dare to take it to the court before the unrighteous, instead of taking it before the saints?" (1 Cor 6:1).

⁶ In addition to Rudolf Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (ed. Otto Merk; 8th enlarged ed.; UTB 630; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1980), see Rudolf Bultmann, "Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus," *ZNW* 23 (1924) 123–40; reprinted in idem, *Exegetica* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967) 36–54.

Pagans, Paul observes, should not solve the problems of Christians; this is the negative answer. Then, if one reads 1 Cor 6:1–11 carefully, instead of offering one unique positive solution, we discern that Paul offers two. He suggests first a kind of minimum in Christian attitude: solve your problems in the community, for example, by establishing a court of wise and independent believers. This solution should be sufficient to smooth tensions and extirpate the conflicts: "Are you incompetent to try trivial cases?" (1 Cor 6:2), he asks in his rhetorical style. But once he has advanced this good, though not perfect, solution he adds another: "In fact, even to have lawsuits against one another is already a defeat for you. Why not rather be wronged? Why not be defrauded?" (1 Cor 6:7); why not suffer; why not accept being on the losing side? This is indeed the better solution.

The second example arises out of tensions and sexual problems at Corinth. Here again, Paul feels it is his responsibility to provide guidance and advice. Entering examples of several concrete situations, he takes the risk of introducing casuistic rules: What should one do if your spouse is not a Christian? What happens to the children in such a union? What about those who are widowed or single? One thing is clear: in each instance, after rejecting the bad solution, Paul offers first a solution that is good, a solution that is in harmony with justice. But, just as love is better than equity (see 1 Cor 12:31: "And I shall show you a still more excellent way"), so also self-denial, personal sacrifice, ascetic options, love for one's enemy, and non-resistance constitute the better Christian path. In the case of sexual behavior, this perfect road is already presented in the first sentence: "Now concerning the matters about which you wrote, it is well – such is the opinion of Paul and not the Corinthians – for a man not to touch a woman" (1 Cor 7:1).

Our third example concerns alimentation, food being as basic to the human condition as sex and competition. Here again Paul offers a subtle range of comments in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10. Both passages share Paul's reflection on freedom: Christians are free and therefore they can eat everything. The ritual aspect of the mosaic regulations is abandoned; only the spiritual remains: "Hence, as to the eating of food offered to idols, we know that no idol in the world really exists, and that there is no God but one" (1 Cor 8:4). Christians, therefore, are not prohibited from eating meat offered in sacrifice to pagan gods, considered here as idols, or from buying it on the common market. This is a good solution (one finds an echo of it in two Pastoral Epistles, 1 Tim 4:3–5 and Titus 1:15).

But here again wisdom and freedom are not superior to the way of love; if one's freedom hurts a Christian companion who is weak then this is not the wisest solution. There is a better way, a solution that respects totally the opinion of brothers and sisters in Christ: "Therefore, if food is a cause of their falling, I will never eat meat, so that I may not cause one of them to fall" (1 Cor 8:13). To abstain from the pleasure of one's freedom and to abstain from it freely is the superior ethical road.

It is clear that the better solution is always connected with the well-being of the community. Personal progress does not reach the highest level of attainment if it does not contribute to the *οικοδομή* of the churches.⁷ The best solution to the particular sexual problems in Corinth will bring peace to the whole community.⁸

These three cases are not exceptions in Paul’s thought. They represent regular concretions in Paul’s approach to ethical thinking. Our most ancient document written by the apostle, the first letter to the Thessalonians, already brings this way of thinking to the attention of new converts. In 1 Thessalonians 4, the oldest ethical treatise written by a Christian, Paul already draws a distinction between the minimal attitude that each believer should adopt, namely to walk and to please God (1 Thess 4:1), and a superior, higher commitment. This superior goal is summarized in a sentence attached to a statement about minimal obedience: “To walk and to please God” is the first step on the scale; it should bring a Christian to the second step, which Paul calls “to become more abundant,” probably in kindness and love, in wisdom and perfection (1 Thess 4:1).

In another quotation from 1 Thessalonians we again find the progression from the good to the better: “And may the Lord make you increase and abound in love for one another and for all, just as we abound in love for you” (1 Thess 3:12). “Love for one another” is the correct, the good ethical attitude, the fulfillment of Johannine mutual love (John 15:12); but love “for all” – love for those who do not love you, love for those who exist outside – is the better solution, the one that fulfills Jesus’ command in the Sermon on the Mount that we love our enemies (Matt 5:44//Luke 6:27).

Such a possible – and even desirable – crescendo from a good to a better solution is also readily apparent in one of Paul’s last letters, the epistle to the Philippians. There, Paul says that a Christian’s initial love should progress toward greater abundance (Phil 1:9). The apostle does not hesitate to use the vocabulary of “progress” (*εἰς προκοπήν*, Phil 1:12) to describe this movement. Even in his own personal case, Paul hesitates between two goods: to live in the flesh, which means to be alive and fulfill his pastoral duty for the Philippians, or to be with the Lord, which means to die and to be united with Christ. For Paul, to live means to suffer and imitate Christ’s passion; to die means to participate in the glory of the risen Christ. To remain on earth is the better solution, because it is the most ethical solution, the most profitable for the others. It is therefore only from the standpoint of Paul’s self-interest that the famous sentence in Phil 1:21, “For to me, liv-

⁷ I express my gratitude to Helmut Koester who underlined this point in a letter of March 22, 2005: “Whatever is ‘the Good’ may be good for the establishment of personal morality, but whatever is ‘the Best’ seems to me always related to *οικодομή*.”

⁸ On the notion of *οικοδομή*, see Pierre Bonnard, *Jésus-Christ édifiant son Église. Le concept d’édification dans le Nouveau Testament* (Cahiers théologiques de l’actualité protestante 21; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1946).

ing is Christ and dying is gain,” makes sense. From the perspective of Paul’s superior commitment to his communities, dying is the easy solution and to live is gain. Similarly, for the Philippians, to believe is good but to add suffering for the apostle’s sake is better (Phil 1:29).

The two ethical solutions appear even at the grammatical level, where the use of comparative forms confirms the progression. It is good for Paul to see his disciple Epaphroditus recuperate from illness; but it is better to send him back to his community, revealing in this way his greater zeal (σπουδαιοτέρως, Phil 2:28). The Greek expression πολλῶ μᾶλλον, “much more,” to choose another example, helps Paul express this desirable progression: “Therefore, my beloved, just as you have always obeyed, not only in my presence, but much more (πολλῶ μᾶλλον) now in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12).⁹

To be precise, I should mention a difference between the examples drawn from 1 Corinthians and those taken from the other epistles.¹⁰ In the Corinthian cases, Paul, after rejecting the bad solution, places before his local readers a choice: the good or the best. In his early writing to the Thessalonians he supposes that the good is not static and must lead to the best. The passages quoted from the late epistle to the Philippians confirm the early perspective of 1 Thessalonians. Actually the difference between the alternative or the progression relies on a difference of situation. Considering the bad inclination of the Corinthians, Paul invites them as a minimum to choose the good and preferably to select the best. When writing to the Thessalonians or the Philippians, the apostle is pleased to see that they already are walking accordingly to a right attitude. He can only wish for them to reach the better path, to follow the best ethical standard. Behind all the examples given in these pages there is therefore the ethical structure of the good and the better. Skillfully the apostle applies this structure according to the different circumstances to which he and his communities are confronted.

Paul’s Thinking and the Philosophical Tradition

The religious tradition of Israel was determined by the opposition that exists between the pure and the impure, the sacred and the profane, the holy and the unholy. This distinction was respected at the ritual level as well as the moral. Fundamentally, the ethical structure of the good and the better does not reflect this Jewish perspective. Rather, it was the Greeks who experienced that the good of a city, or of an individual, could take several different shades or degrees: this could be the average good or the most precious one. The discovery of conflicting refer-

⁹ Even if most of the time Paul opposes in the epistle to the Romans the good and the bad, he alludes to the structure of the good, the bad, and the better in Rom 5:1–11; 8:30; and 12:1–2.

¹⁰ I am grateful to Glenn E. Snyder who drew my attention to this difference.

ences to several goods forced the Greeks to create a hierarchy of goods. The well-being of the Greek confederation, whose unity was manifested through language and ritual celebrations, was located above the well-being of the local city. In Sophocles’ *Antigone* (lines 449–55), Antigone clearly appeals to a higher dimension than Creon’s reference to the laws of city of Thebes. She appeals to the law of the laws. This same distinction appears in Plato’s writings, when he distinguishes in the *Republic* degrees of justice (*Resp.* 2.367), and when he affirms that there is a truth about the gods that is higher than myth (*Resp.* 2.378).

In his *Nicomachean Ethics* (1.5.2–7) Aristotle likewise distinguishes – in a way that may almost be considered arrogant – three groups in their relationship to philosophy. The first group, the crowds, represent the bad: those who have no access to wisdom. The second group, consisting of politicians, represent the good: those who are able to reach a certain level of understanding, but not the highest; they can conceive justice but not real wisdom. The third group consists of the philosophers, who alone are equipped to enter the realm of contemplation. They enjoy not only the good but also the best.

This intellectual distinction finds its concrete application – if I am well informed – in the way teaching was organized at the Athenian Lyceum. In the morning Aristotle would deliver the esoteric, or acroamatic, teaching, to those few who were considered fit for this higher education.¹¹ Then early in the afternoon he would teach the men of action, bringing them the rudiments of political wisdom. This was exoteric teaching.

I will not elaborate the history of this distinction, but I will insist on its presence as a common heritage in the first century C.E. It survives in the distinction the Stoics drew between the ἀμάρτημα, the bad action, the ἀδιάφορον, the indifferent, and the κατόρθωμα, the right action. It also survives in late Stoicism when the προκόπτων, the one who improves, the one who makes progresses, is inserted between the φαῦλος, the mean, the bad person, and the τέλειος, the accomplished person, the one who is perfect. The distinction also survives in Valentinian thought, as attested by Irenaeus in his *Adversus haereses* 1.7.5 and 1.8.3. According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians distinguished three kinds of human beings: the hylic, or the material; the psychic, that is, the human; and the pneumatic, or spiritual people.

It is probable that this division between the good and the best was accepted into Judaism, which was so widely influenced by the dominant culture of the Greeks from the time of Alexander the Great. It is clear to me that Paul, a Jew but also a Greek, trained in grammar, rhetoric, and perhaps philosophy at Tarsus, used this distinction with ease and profit.

¹¹ See Jean Voilquin, “Préface,” to Aristote, *Éthique de Nicomaque* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1965) 6.

The Christological Model

Paul's ethical prescriptions are not only rooted in the Jewish opposition of the good and the bad and the Greek distinction of the good and the better. They find their final relevance according to the christological model. The apostle's source of his personal attitude and of the conduct he prescribes to his converts is a person and not a code of rules or an abstract ethical structure. The person of Christ is for him a redeemer and a model. Through his death on the cross, Christ not only brought believers into the realm of freedom, but he also offered his own life as a model of ethical behavior. To be redeemed, to be in Christ, does not separate a Christian from history and society. But to be alive, to be "in the flesh" – to use the apostle's words – neither forces a Christian to compromise nor compels him to sin. The way to be in the world is to behave according to Christ. This is valid for the individual as well as for the community.

Paul does not hesitate to use the vocabulary of imitation.¹² He asks the Corinthians to be his imitators as he is an imitator of Christ (1 Cor 11:1). But there is an understanding of imitation that does not coincide with Paul's understanding of it: imitation as a human effort to reach the qualities of the model to the greatest extent possible. In such a case imitation remains a subjective activity relying on the personal responsibility and forces of the individual. It is often in such a way that the Greek philosophical tradition understood imitation. But according to its origin in the cult of Dionysos and its manifestation in the Greek theater, imitation is rooted in participation in the god. Such is Paul's understanding of imitation: it is not the external appropriation of Jesus' gestures, but first the surrender of the believer to Christ and second the display of Christian virtues practiced by this regenerated person.¹³ For Paul, Jesus, who gave himself to others, is primarily the redeemer, but his way of life and of dying becomes also a model of behavior.

It is interesting to note that Paul is able to bring together the christological model and the ethical structure of the good and the better. In Jesus' life, certain aspects, his faith and his just conduct, belong to the first, namely the good; other aspects, his love of others and his death for others, belong to the later, namely the better.

Several expressions and metaphors make this christological model more visible. Just as Christ was sent into the world by God, so Christians are sent out to those who stand outside their community (Gal 1:16; Rom 10:14–15). As Christ has entered this world (Phil 2:6–8), so Christians shall pass through a door – such is the metaphor in 1 Cor 16:9 and 2 Cor 2:12 – opened by God himself. As Christ

¹² Paul has a preference for the substantive μιμητής (see 1 Thess 1:6; 2:14; 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1; see also Eph 5:1), but the verb μιμέομαι is present in 2 Thess 3:7, 9; see Hans Dieter Betz, *Nachfolge und Nachahmung Jesu Christi im Neuen Testament* (BHT 37; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967).

¹³ I thank here Helmut Koester who in discussing this paper with me correctly insisted on this aspect.

offered himself in a sacrifice of expiation (Rom 3:25), so Paul considers it to be his apostolic duty to fulfill a sacerdotal function – according to the metaphor in Rom 15:15–16 – in order that the nations may become a sacrifice, an offering (προσφορά), agreeable to God and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. As Christ brought light and divine glory into the world, so Christians are to be – using still another metaphor – lamps or stars (φωστῆρες) in the world: “Do all things without murmuring and arguing, so that you may be blameless and innocent, children of God without blemish in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, in which you shine like light-giving bodies in the world” (Phil 1:14–15). As Christ achieved victory over death, so also Christians are to bring to the world the fragrance (ὄσμή), the aroma (εὐωδία) of life in Christ, to those who will be saved (2 Cor 2:14–16). Or, using the classical vocabulary of love, the word ἀγάπη and the verb ἀγαπάω, Paul urges his communities to practice hospitality, forgiveness, and reconciliation.

According to Paul’s argument, it is even possible to understand the reason why Christ can be imitated: it is not because of Jesus’ historical behavior but, more deeply, because of Christ’s incarnation that this is possible. If a believer is able to become a Jew with the Jews and a Greek with the Greeks, this is in imitation of Christ, who abandoned his divine sphere in order to enter into the realm of humanity. The Son’s priority was not to bring people to himself, but to move towards them, to reach out to them. The hymn in Philippians 2 expresses the risk Christ took in order to do this, namely, he left his divine nature and made himself empty (κενόω): “Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death – even death on a cross” (Phil 2:5–8). This passage is the hermeneutical key to verses in 1 Cor 9:19–21, where Paul expresses his apostolic mission as well as a Christian’s ethical commitment: “For though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all, so that I might win more of them. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win the Jews. To those under the law I became as one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so that I might win those who are under the law. To those outside the law I became as one outside the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so that I might win those outside the law.” For Paul, as for any Christian, to become a Jew with the Jews or a Greek with the Greeks is an expression of love, even an acceptance of death; but even if it means a loss of life, it is not a loss of identity.

To lose one’s life is a way of saving it: in giving up his secure position at the side of God the Son took a risk, but he never lost his identity as the Son. Similarly, the ethical way to reach the other, through fulfilling the law or breaking its commands, does not destroy the core of one’s identity in Christ. As long as communion with God is respected and one’s relationship with Christ is preserved, free-

dom does not become a tool, a selfish tool but remains an instrument of charity. Such was Christ's behavior when he joined himself to the human condition out of love and in the hope of redemption. The crescendo from good to better applies even to Christ, and the Christian counterpart reflects in its humanity the divine model. Life in the realm of God was of course good for the Son, but the Son chose the better, the more difficult way to fulfill his divinity, namely to cross the border and assume the human condition. This movement toward the other was not an exotic selfish experience, but a generous translocation, a way of reaching the place where human beings exist, in order to help them move to a better place.

Paul's missionary theory follows this christological model. Paul refuses to receive the revelation of the Son on the road to Damascus (Gal 1:15–16) in a passive way. He is not content simply to enjoy redemption. To that good gift he prefers the better duty: he accepts being sent, and he expects all his disciples and all the Christian communities not to keep themselves quietly in the harbor of peace; as *navis ecclesiae* they must sail bravely to reach others in their own turbulent situations.

In his inimitable pictorial style Luke the evangelist captures this choice for the better in his description of the apostle in the book of Acts. Paul could stay in Caesarea as a pastor, fulfilling the dearest wishes of the community there. But, according to Luke, he prefers instead to exchange this good solution for a better one: he will leave his fellow Christians and go to Rome, where his apostolic mission will end in martyrdom. Luke's account of this decision reads as follows:

The next day we left and came to Caesarea; and we went into the house of Philip the evangelist, one of the seven, and stayed with him While we were staying there for several days, a prophet named Agabus came down from Judea. He came to us and took Paul's belt, bound his own feet and hands with it, and said, "Thus says the Holy Spirit, 'This is the way the Jews in Jerusalem will bind the man who owns this belt and will hand him over to the Gentiles.'" When we heard this, we and the people there urged him not to go up to Jerusalem. Then Paul answered, "What are you doing, weeping and breaking my heart? For I am ready not only to be bound but even to die in Jerusalem for the name of the Lord Jesus." Since he would not be persuaded, we remained silent except to say, "The Lord's will be done." (Acts 21:8–14)

Scriptural Authority and the Doctrine of God

As a Jewish theologian Paul aims at the harmony between his thinking and the scriptures of Israel. But here he faces a difficulty since the Hebrew scriptures, even in their Greek translation of the Septuagint, do not witness the ethical structure of the good and the better. The interplay of biblical quotations, particularly in Galatians and in Romans, makes this particularly clear. To find an agreement between his conviction and Israel's holy books, the apostle follows a double path: he dares to use the ancient scriptures according to the new model. According to

the apostle, to understand righteousness in a dynamic way leading from a good beginning to a better one through a progressive moral effort is not opposed to the divine commands of the Law. But Paul is pushing his reflection even further. He risks the following hypothesis: the scriptures of Israel, which display so vividly in an antithetic position the good and the bad, the righteous and the sinner, manifest an image of God, as personal entity, promoting the ethical structure of the good and the best. Eternal and eternally faithful to himself, the God of Israel does not need the structure of the good and the best. But facing his creation and even more, his fallen creation, he will adopt in his economy of redemption a project compatible with the Greek ethical structure.

It is Paul’s conviction that the God of creation is the same as the God of redemption. Paul’s use of tradition, his use – for example – of early Christian hymnic and homologetical material, as in 1 Corinthians 8, makes this clear. In this brief quotation of an early liturgical fragment, Paul considers the Father as well as the Son. The mediation of the Son is made clear by the use of the preposition *διὰ* (“through”): it is through Christ that the world was created and it is also through Christ that the creation is redeemed. The authority of the Father is underlined by the use of two other prepositions, *ἐκ* at the origin of everything and *εἰς* at the destination of everything: “Indeed, even though there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth – as in fact there are many gods and many lords – yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom (*ἐξ οὗ*) are all things and for whom (*εἰς αὐτόν*) we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom (*δι’ οὗ*) are all things and through whom (*δι’ αὐτοῦ*) we exist” (1 Cor 8:6).

From this fragment, as well as from other Pauline passages in which the apostle establishes a symmetry and a contrast between creation and redemption, we can say that if the creation was good – and the text of Genesis says that it was – then the redemption is better. The redemption can be called a “treasure” that is poured into the “clay jars” of human creatures (2 Cor 4:7). The harmony that exists between the creatures’ prayers (“the creation itself,” *αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις*) and the redeemed community’s requests (“we,” *ἡμεῖς*) reveals by the same token that the God of creation has reached a kind of fulfillment through his work of redemption (Rom 8:21–22).

Rudolf Bultmann said – not without some excess – that New Testament theology is anthropology.¹⁴ What is true in Paul’s statement concerning the good and the better in God remains for the most part only implicit, being deducible from his affirmations concerning its human counterpart. In 2 Cor 3:18, for example, Paul does not hesitate to say that the believers already share in the divine glory;

¹⁴ See Bultmann’s statement that “Es zeigt sich also: will man von Gott reden, so muß man offenbar *von sich selbst reden*” (italics Bultmann’s) in Rudolf Bultmann, “Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?,” *TBl* 4 (1925) 129–35; reprinted in idem, *Glauben und Verstehen*, vol. 1 (3d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1958) 26–37; the quotation appears on p. 28 of the collection of essays.

but even more, they are progressively transformed from glory to glory, revealing in their own being the better part of the good creator, his wish to redeem definitively: "And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit."

Conclusion

By way of a conclusion, I ask one final question: What advantage does recourse to this ethical structure of the good and the best offer? As a response, I will propose that simple antithetical oppositions such as holiness and sin, the righteous and the wicked, God and Mammon, were efficient in the context of preaching, mission, and conversion. But the development of a more complex crescendo, or hierarchy of goods, made it possible for philosophers as well as the theologians to offer a wider spectrum of ethical solutions in the context of teaching and catechism. These solutions brought movement, flexibility, and freedom to what could have become a static system. It is not, after all, by chance that Paul uses the term "progress," προκοπή, in such a context; nor is it by chance that he refers to the metaphor of the way and uses the preposition εἰς, "toward," "to." On their ethical way, namely in their daily lives, Christian can ascend from glory to glory, ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν (2 Cor 3:18). Finally it is not by chance that Paul speaks of abundance and even superabundance, for he took the risk of adding sanctification to justification, love to equity, perfection to goodness, σοφία το κήρυγμα.

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Names and Numbers in Early Christianity

Introduction

It is my hypothesis that the early Christians used the categories of ‘name’ and ‘number’ as theological tools.¹ Often they consciously interpreted names and numbers in a symbolic way. Even their non-reflexive usage relied on implicit conceptualizations very different from our nominalist-based thinking. They presupposed that names and numbers are inextricably related.² Is the Jewish and Christian confession εἶς ὁ θεός not a cogent expression combining a name and a number? Like other Jewish movements, the first churches were immersed in a multi-ethnic ocean reflecting centuries of Greek epistemology and Babylonian mathematics. It is therefore simplistic to imagine early Christian thought as influenced merely by Semitic, biblical thought.³ I suggest that early Christian reflections on names and numbers not only bear witness to a strong relationship between language and reality, but also manifest a significant difference between signifier and referent. God is the master of names and numbers, thus conferring an ontological quality to any creation.⁴ As the race of humans, however, is differ-

¹ Presidential address, Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, Tel Aviv, 2000. I would like to thank my colleague and friend Gabriel Widmer who discussed the matter with me. He gave me also some bibliographic references, such as the articles “Nombre” and “Nomen (nom),” in *Les notions philosophiques. Dictionnaire* (vol. 2 of *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*; ed. Sylvain Auroux; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990) 1755–62. I would like also to express my gratitude to Elizabeth Busky who revised my English, Anna Miller who checked numerous references for me, David Warren who read the proofs with me, and particularly to Ann Graham Brock who following the preparation of this paper revised its form and content with talent and diligence. I thank finally those auditors of my address, members of the SNTS, who gave me their reactions and comments.

² On the contrary, in modern times, fighting an aristocratic society and Christian personalism, Lenin proclaimed that it was time to abandon names and introduce the language of numbers; see Bastian Wielenga, *Lenins Weg zur Revolution* (Munich: Kaiser, 1971); Yann Redalié, “Conversion ou libération? Actes 16,11–40,” *BCPE* 26:7 (1974) 19–31, esp. 21–22. I owe my interest in the topic of names and numbers to discussions in the 1970s with Yann Redalié.

³ I agree here with James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

⁴ Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 2.25.1, insists on this theocentrism: it is God who is the master of names and numbers. In *Adv. haer.* 1.15.5, the bishop of Lyons criticizes Mark the Magician for imprisoning God in human names and numbers.

ent from the race of the gods, to speak with Pindar,⁵ so names and numbers are also human expressions. Accordingly a total equality between language and reality cannot be reached and remains an illusion.

Not everyone may be convinced of the importance of names and numbers in early Christianity, particularly of speculations as to their various meanings.⁶ Many ancient authors, both Jews and Christians, tried to inquire concerning the name of "God" with a will both to know and to communicate a religious knowledge. Certain that the real name of the divinity eludes human perception, they believed that God had revealed his sacred names, such as "Lord" or "Sabaoth," to humans.⁷ For example, some manuscripts of *3 Enoch* contain an impressive list of divine names.⁸ A similar interest led several ancient authors to communicate the names of angels,⁹ of the fallen angels or watchers,¹⁰ of Satan,¹¹ of demons,¹² of Jesus,¹³ and of his disciples.¹⁴ Those who wished to establish such enumerations were interested not only in names but also in numbers: for instance, how many angels, how many names?¹⁵ The numerous instances of a census in the book of

⁵ Pindar, *Nemean Ode* 6.1. I thank Ellen Aitken who helped me to find this reference.

⁶ On names see Hans Bietenhard, "ὄνομα κτλ.," *TWNT* 5:242–83; A. Heubeck, "Personennamen, A. Griechische," *Lexikon der alten Welt* (ed. Carl Andresen et al.; Zurich: Artemis, 1965) 2267–68; W. Krenkel, "Namengebung," *ibid.*, 2056; Lazlo Vanyó, "Nom," *Dictionnaire encyclopédique du christianisme ancien* (ed. Angelo Di Berardino; trans. François Vial; 2 vols.; Paris: Cerf, 1990) 2:1759–61; on numbers see Oskar Rühle, "ἀριθμῆω, ἀριθμός," *TWNT* 1:461–64; Peter Friesenhahn, *Hellenistische Wortzahlenmystik im Neuen Testament* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1935); Jören Friberg, "Numbers and Counting," *ABD* 4 (1992) 1139–46.

⁷ See the *Prayer of Jacob*, difficult to date (1st–4th cent. C.E.); James H. Charlesworth, "Prayer of Jacob," in *OTP* 2:715–23. See also the riddle on the name of God in *Sibylline Oracles* 1.137–46.

⁸ *3 Enoch* 48B; *Quaest. Barth.* 4.23. One knows the interest of Islam for the 99 names of Allah. For this idea see Arthur Jeffery, ed., *A Reader on Islam: Passages from Standard Arabic Writings Illustrative of the Beliefs and Practices of Muslims* (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton and Co., 1962) 553–55.

⁹ *2 Enoch* 40; *3 Enoch* 17.

¹⁰ On the fallen angels, see *1 Enoch* 6.7; 69.2–14. Strangely, Kasb'el, the chief executor of the oath, has a number and a name (*1 Enoch* 69.13–14). On the watchers, associated with the angels in passages like *1 Enoch* 21.10, particularly with those in Gen 6:1–8 that were sent from heaven, see *1 Enoch* (1.4–5; 10.9; 12; 15) as well as *Jubilees* (4.15; 7.21; 8.3). See also *Acts Phil.* 8.11 and 11.3 for reference to these beings.

¹¹ *Quaest. Barth.* 4.23, 45.

¹² Mark 5:9.

¹³ As for God, the real name of the mediator remains hidden; only "Jesus," as a name of this world, is revealed, according to *Ascen. Isa.* 8.7–9.5; see *Acts Thom.* 163.2.

¹⁴ From Mary Magdalene to Peter, from Paul to James.

¹⁵ On the symbolic value attributed to numbers by peoples of antiquity see Georges Ifrah, *Histoire universelle des chiffres. L'intelligence des hommes racontée par les nombres et le calcul* (Bouquins; 2 vols.; Paris: Laffont, 1994) *passim*; Friberg, "Numbers and Counting," 1143–45. Number speculation was characteristic of Pythagorism; see Adela Yarbro Collins, "Numerical Symbolism in Jewish and Early Christian Apocalyptic Literature," in *ANRW* 2.21.2 (1984) 1250–53; but Porphyry also may have written a work on numbers; see H. Kees, "Porphyrios," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (66 vols.; ed. Georg Wissowa

Numbers is an example of this phenomenon.¹⁶ Actually the title “Numbers” (ἀριθμοί) is not the original one; it was given by the translators of the book into Greek. In the Hebrew Bible it is called “In the wilderness,” according to its first word. Another example is the use of a particular number, such as 12,¹⁷ which occurs many times: it is used for the tribes of Israel, then for the 12 apostles,¹⁸ and later by the author of the *Book of the Resurrection according to Bartholomew* for their 12 thrones and their 12 garments.¹⁹ The evangelist Luke is not the only one interested in marking time.²⁰ Mark has already eagerly mentioned the exact moment of several episodes of Jesus’ passion: the sixth hour, the ninth hour, the evening, and early in the morning.²¹ The theological significance of the number 40 is well known,²² beginning with Moses²³ and continuing with Jesus’ temptations²⁴ and appearances.²⁵ The number seven, so significant for the book of Genesis, still has a special role in the book of Revelation, as seen in the seven churches (Revelation 1–4), the seven letters (Revelation 2–3), the seven seals (Revelation 5–8), the seven trumpets (Revelation 8–11), the seven cups, and the seven angels (Revelation 15–17).²⁶ Often numbers are used as a cryptic way of referring to names and people, such as the famous 666 of the book of Revelation.²⁷ On the

et al.; Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1953) 43:300. Plotinus’s *Enead* 6.6 deals with numbers and Augustine knew this treatise; see Olivier du Roy, *L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu’en 391* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966) 70 n. 1. Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 1.10.35: geometry has two divisions; one is concerned with numbers, the other with figures. Now knowledge of the former is a necessity not merely to the orator, but to anyone who has had even an elementary education.

¹⁶ The book contains also the mention of the 70 elders (Num 11:24–25), the names of the 12 explorers (Num 13:4–16), and the episode of the 12 rods (Num 17:1–11; see below n. 58). See also the Jewish reflection on the numbers of the biblical books.

¹⁷ According to 4 *Ezra* 14:10–12, time is divided into 12; it gets older because 9.5 periods have gone already.

¹⁸ Mark 3:13–19 par.; Matt 19:28 par.

¹⁹ *Book of the Resurrection according to Bartholomew* 21.8.

²⁰ See the famous synchronism in Luke 3:1; the date of Elizabeth’s pregnancy in Luke 1:36; the end of Mary’s visit to her cousin in Luke 1:56; the three periods of Jesus’ life and those of the history of salvation.

²¹ See Mark 15:25, 30, 33, 34; 15:42.

²² Other numbers were believed to be pure and for some of them to represent plenitude, like 4, 7, 8 and 10; see Friedrich Hauck, “δέκα,” *TWNT* 2:35–36; Karl Heinrich Rengstorf, “ἐπτά κτλ.,” *TWNT* 2:623–31; Horst Balz, “τέσσαρες κτλ.,” *TWNT* 8:127–39.

²³ Exod 34:29; Deut 9:9; *Barn.* 4.7–8; there are also the 40 days of the explorers (Num 14:34) and the 40 years of punishment in the wilderness (Num 14:33); see Origen, *Hom. Num.* 8.1.5.

²⁴ Matt 4:2 par.

²⁵ Acts 1:3.

²⁶ See Collins, “Numerical Symbolism in Jewish and Early Christian Apocalyptic Literature,” 1221–87. 4 *Ezra* 7:132–40 enumerates seven attributes of God: God is merciful, gracious, patient, bountiful, abundant in compassion, giver, and judge. The treatise *On the Origin of the World* (NHC II, 5 and XIII, 2) 101.24–102.2 names the seven androgynous names of the seven divine forces. The number seven is also important for the author of the *Poimandres* (*Corpus Hermeticum* 1) 9: God, called νοῦς, creates seven governors, probably the seven planets.

²⁷ Rev 13:18.

other hand, names can also encapsulate numbers, as when the name of Jesus is abbreviated to the number 888 according to the Valentinian Mark the Magician.²⁸

In ancient Jewish or Christian texts, when a divine message is received and written, inherent in the narrative are concerns about the name of the revealing entity as well as the individual to whom the revelation is delivered. When a reflection on a sacred legacy or history emerges in these texts, numbers may articulate periods of time and destiny.²⁹ When the eyes of the wise contemplate creation, including heaven and earth and its many peoples, then measure and dimension, as expressed with numbers and names, appear to justify a theological claim or defend a religious orientation.³⁰ Such is the case in the Wisdom of Solomon.³¹ Likewise, the establishment of a holy people as the recipients of divine revelation goes hand in hand with numbers. While the author of *4 Ezra* is preoccupied with the small number of the saved,³² others are proud to be part of the happy few; still others apply the title “the many” to their congregation,³³ and the book of Revelation fixes the boundaries of the community at 144,000.³⁴

Twenty centuries separate us from the origins of Christianity. Among the obstacles that scholars of early Christianity must overcome, the most difficult are also perhaps the most abstract. With our logic influenced by the binary system of modern technology, can we understand a mind that works according to another, probably ternary, logic?³⁵ Influenced by centuries of nominalist thinking, are we able to imagine another relationship between language and thought, or between names or numbers and reality?³⁶

²⁸ See Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.15.2; see also, the first book of the *Sibylline Oracles*, analyzed below, pp. 31–32 (*Sib.* 1.324–31). In *Adv. haer.* 1.15.1–3, Irenaeus gives his interpretation of the name of Jesus.

²⁹ See Collins, “Numerical Symbolism,” 1224–49; James C. VanderKam, *Calendars in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Measuring Time* (The Literature of the Dead Sea Scrolls; London/New York: Routledge, 1998).

³⁰ Such as monotheism. See *1 Clem* 29: “The bounds of the nations are established κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ, according to the number of the angels of God.”

³¹ See Wis 11:20; C. Larcher, *Études sur le Livre de la Sagesse* (EB; Paris: Gabalda, 1969) 187, 218–21; David Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982) 234–35; see nn. 61 and 91 below.

³² *4 Ezra* 7:45–61.

³³ See in the Dead Sea Scrolls for example 1QS 6.1–7.25; Joachim Jeremias, “Das Lösegeld für viele (Mark 10,45),” *Judaica* 3 (1947) 249–64; Géza Vermès, *The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English* (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1997) 28.

³⁴ Rev 7:4. Absorbed by polemics, the leader of a community can disregard another group in the following way: “And there shall be others of those who are outside our number who name themselves bishops and also deacons ...” (*Apocalypse of Peter* [NHC VII, 3] 79).

³⁵ See Johann Mader, *Die logische Struktur des personalen Denkens. Aus der Methode der Gotteserkenntnis bei Aurelius Augustinus* (Wien: Herder, 1965).

³⁶ The reader should not forget the importance and power of name and numbers in magic; see Fritz Graf, *Magic in the Ancient World* (trans. Franklin Philip; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

Biblical Memories

The Jewish Scriptures are clearly concerned with names and numbers. These passages of the Hebrew Bible or the Septuagint contained an authoritative teaching and a model for new speculations. The New Testament and early Christian literature likewise continued and even added to this reflection on names and numbers.

At the burning bush, Moses' request to know God's name is answered with a riddle that camouflages the divine name. In the Septuagint, the Tetragrammaton is translated with the present participle of the verb "to be," which represents a theological interpretation: ὁ ὢν, "the one being" (Exod 3:14).³⁷ This understanding of God³⁸ was continued but modified by the first Christians. In John 8:58 the evangelist makes an allusion to this episode with Moses and gives it a christological interpretation.

The numerous biblical attestations of the expression "name of God" or "Lord" witness the distance between God as a person and God as a name.³⁹ They confirm also the respect that is due to this hidden and yet revealed God.⁴⁰ The hallowing of God's name and the avoiding of the profaning of God's name are central to Israel's religion. Likewise the Decalogue, particularly its third command to the members of the covenant, states: "You shall not make wrongful use of the name of the Lord your God, for the Lord will not acquit anyone who misuses his name" (Exod 20:7 par.). Likewise, the first request of the Lord's prayer, "Hallowed be

³⁷ The episode is remembered by Josephus, *Ant.* 2.264, but with no insistence on the revelation of God's name.

³⁸ See *Celui qui est. Interprétations juives et chrétiennes d'Exode 3,14* (ed. Alain de Libera and Emilie Zum Brunn; Patrimoines. Religions du livre; Paris: Cerf, 1986). Josephus, *Ant.* 11.331, tells the story of Alexander refusing to kill the high priest of Jerusalem and showing on the contrary great interest by greeting the name of God inscribed on the golden plate of the Jewish hierarch.

³⁹ There is a shift in the location of the name of God: in the Hebrew Bible it dwells in the ark of the covenant (see 2 Sam 6:2; see also Exod 25:8), then in the Temple (see 1 Kings 9:3; see also 2 Sam 7:13; 1 Kings 8:10–11; Jer 7:10). In the early Christian writings it dwells in the new temple, the community (1 Cor 3:16), or the believer (1 Cor 6:19).

⁴⁰ Origen, *On Psalm 2:2*, tells us that the name of God was read as Adonai by the Hebrews and as κύριος by the Greeks; see Gustav Adolf Deissmann, *Die Hellenisierung des semitischen Monotheismus* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1903); Ralph Marcus, "Divine Names and Attributes in Hellenistic Jewish Literature," in *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 2 (1931–1932) 45–120; Efraim Elimelech Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs* (trans. Israel Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975) 97–134; Colin H. Roberts, *Manuscript, Society, and Belief in Early Christian Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) 29 n. 2, 30; Marguerite Harl, "La langue de la Septante," in Gilles Dorival, Marguerite Harl, and Olivier Munier, *La Bible grecque des Septante. Du judaïsme au christianisme ancien* (Initiations au christianisme ancien; Paris: Cerf and C.N.R.S., 1988) 255–56; Martin Rosel, *Adonaj, Warum Gott "Herr" genannt wird?* (FAT 29; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

thy name" (Matt 6:9 par.), fits perfectly into this religious framework, as does the early Christians' reverence for the "name of God" (for example, John 17:6).⁴¹

According to the book of Exodus, Moses, the admired leader, needed the help of his brother Aaron (Exod 4:10–17). Greek-speaking Jews, particularly Philo of Alexandria, contemplated why such help was necessary. Philo concludes that Moses represents the experience of God's presence while Aaron represents the need for words, particularly names, to express this religious experience.⁴² God as a person remains transcendent; God's real name, nature, and person cannot be known,⁴³ but the experience of God can be known and needs to be expressed. There is, therefore, a correlation between religious reality and religious expression. The words are so important that some texts stipulate that this spiritual experience must be expressed in Hebrew, the divine language of creation, a language thought to have been forgotten after the fall but rediscovered in the time of Abraham.⁴⁴

According to Gen 2:19–20 the importance of naming begins with creation because God entrusted Adam with the responsibility of giving names to the animals.⁴⁵ Even for us today, bestowing names is still an important matter (a name must fit and be well chosen). If the given name seems artificial or does not fit, often a nickname is chosen that does fit. In antiquity different solutions were given to the question of the link between *res* and *verbum*. Several pre-Socratic philosophers and all the sophists thought that names were given not by nature (φύσις) but by convention (θέσις). The Stoics, on the other hand, believed in an intrinsic relationship between names and reality. Their theory of the universal λόγος invited them to insist on the natural aspect of names. The Platonic tradition chose a middle way. Names are given by convention, but they are also the way, the only way, to reach reality. They are like the shadow cast by a body. From their δόξα there is for the industrious mind a way to go back to the realm they express.⁴⁶ Philo participates in this discussion by saying that Adam played a decisive

⁴¹ See for example *Apocalypse of Paul* 6–12; Theodore Silverstein and Anthony Hilhorst, *Apocalypse of Paul: A New Critical Edition of Three Long Latin Versions* (Geneva: Patrick Cramer, 1997) 75–85.

⁴² See Philo, *De migratione Abrahami* 76–85; *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 75–78, 126–32.

⁴³ Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 61.11: "For no one can give a name to the ineffable God: and if anyone should dare say there is one, he raves with a hopeless insanity."

⁴⁴ See *Jubilees* 12.

⁴⁵ The episode is mentioned in the book of *Jubilees* 3.2: "And Adam named all of them, each one according to its name, and whatever he called them became their names" (trans. O. S. Wintermute, in *OTP* 2:58); see also *Midrash Rabbah, Genesis (Bereshith)* 17.4; *Midrash Rabba, I, Genèse Rabba* (trans. Bernard Maruani and Albert Cohen-Arazi; intro. and ann. Bernard Maruani; Les Dix Paroles; Paris: Verdier, 1987) 200–1. Adam knows the names of the animals while the angels ignore them.

⁴⁶ See Plato, *Cratylus*; see also Bietenhard, "ὄνομα," 245–48. The prestige of the wise ὀνοματοθέτης, the "one who gives names," the "namer," in the Greek philosophical tradition underlines the importance of names and naming; see Plato, *Charmides* 175b v.l.; *Cratylus* 389d